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Abstract 
The Great Financial Crisis has been touted to be the worst crisis since the Great Depression of 1930; its 
effect has profound ramifications on the global economy. The nature and the severity of the crisis provoked 
an unprecedented policy response from policy makers at both global and domestic levels. To address the 
rampaging crisis, the Bank of England implemented a number of conventional and unconventional policy 
measures to curtail the economic rot and to stimulate economic growth. There is a broad consensus in the 
empirical literature and other evidence found in this paper that a number of the policies implemented in the 
United Kingdom played a significant role in re-directing and stimulating the economy. This paper reviews 
the various policy measures adopted by the Bank of England from the inception of the financial crisis in 
2008 and assesses their effectiveness in bringing back the economy from the brink of collapse. Our review 
shows that quantitative easing (QE) policy and the expansionary fiscal policy adopted by the Bank of 
England were effective policy tools used in stimulating economic growth, stemming the effect and 
shortening the duration of the crisis in the United Kingdom 
Key words: Policy rates, expansionary fiscal policy, recession, financial crisis, quantitative easing (QE), 
macroeconomics, public debt, monetary policy    
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Introduction 
The Great Financial Crisis was considered to be the 
most severe financial and economic crisis since the 
Great Depression of 1930, the impact of the crisis which 
is rooted in the credit boom induced subprime burble in 
the United States shook the global economy to its 
foundation. Seven years since the end of the crisis, 
many economies - developed and developing alike are 
yet to break free from its shackles. The severity of its 
impact on the financial system and the economy at large 
provoked policy makers around the world to implement 
unprecedented policy measures to stimulate and 
stabilize the financial system and also to curtail the 
global economy’s downward spiral into the abyss.  
The rapidity at which the global economy deteriorated 
brought about a palpable apprehension that can be felt 
across the globe and in every sector of the economy; 
near collapse of the global financial system, drastic fall 
in GDP, high unemployment rate, fall in industrial 
outputs, fall in real household disposable income and 
the economic hardships it created took a heavy toll on 
ordinary people. Apart from the United States, the 
United Kingdom was one of the worst hit by the crisis 
among the Group of Seven (G7) countries. At the height 
of the crisis, the British economy Quarter on Quarter 
growth plummeted from the pre-crisis Gross domestic 
Product1 (GDP) level of 1.1% in 2005 Q4 to -2.1% in 
De 2008 Q4, unemployment rate rose from 5.4% in 
December 2006 to a 7.6%,  government deficit grew 
                                                             
1 Sources: Office For National Statistics 
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substantially from £36.9b in 2006 to £153.5b in 2009 
representing 3.1% and 10.2% as a percentage of GDP2 
(Office for National Statistics & Office for Budget 
responsibility) while Northern Rock Bank and Bradford 
and Bingley were unable to honour claims against them 
by their customers and also incapable of funding their 
operations to maintain their going concerns in the Q4 of 
2007 and 2008 respectively. According to the National 
Audit Office, the UK government has spent a whopping 
£850 billion on the financial crisis as at 2009. Table I 
below show the breakdown of this amount. Government 
provision of support to UK banks during the crisis was 
of two types: The first is the provision of guarantees and 
other non-cash support; this includes the Asset 
Protection Scheme, Special liquidity scheme, Credit 
Guarantee Scheme and other forms of guarantees and 
indemnities. The second category of support involves 
making cash available in form of loan to bankrupt banks 
to support their deposits and purchase of bank share 
capital (see Table 1) 
Table 1: Breakdown of UK Commitment to Financial 
Sector as of December 2009 
Program Amount Description 
Purchase of 
Bank Share 
Capital 
£76   billion Shares in RBS 
and Lloyds 
Liquidity 
Support 
£200 billion Quantitative 
Easing 
Credit 
Guarantees 
£250 billion Guarantees on 
bank’s borrowing 
Loan £40   billion Loan to Bradford 
& Bingley and 
others 
Other 
guarantees 
£280 billion To provide 
insurance cover 
for banks 
Source: National Audit Office 
Financial crises are not a recent phenomenon, it is a 
regular occurrence with similar causes (Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2009); and the United Kingdom is not a 
stranger to economic crises, its economy has survived 
many of the worst economic crises in history started 
with the Panic of 1857. In her long economic history, 
the UK policymakers have adopted various 
macroeconomics policies from Keynesian to Monetarist 
to resolve the various crises. However, the policy 
responses adopted by the policy makers to manage the 
                                                             
2 Borrowing amount figures exclude public sector banks. 
Great Financial Crisis produce a paradigm shift in the 
management of economic and financial crises in the 
country. Policymakers had to dig deeper beyond the 
conventional Keynesian and Monetarist economics to 
manage and curtail the effects of the crisis. A number of 
unconventional measures were adopted in conjunction 
with regular economic policies.  
Plausible explanations for this unprecedented move 
could include those stated in the preceding paragraph 
and also due to the severity of the recession on the 
British economy being the sharpest contraction in the 
nation’s history3, the acute liquidity squeeze among the 
nation’s financial institutions and eventual collapse of 
the banking sector and the effect of the crisis on 
investors and public confidence.  The overarching 
objectives of the UK government that called for such 
unparalleled policy response to the crisis include: 
securing financial stability of the UK economy by 
maintaining liquidity and capital for UK banks, 
protecting the taxpayer and shareholders’ interests4.  
The objective of this paper is to assess the efficiency of 
the key economic policies or measures adopted in the 
United Kingdom to manage the Great Financial Crisis. 
The next section briefly discusses causes of the financial 
crisis. The following section provides a summary of the 
impact of the crisis on the UK economy; Section 4 
reviews the main economic policies implemented in 
Britain The paper then assess the effectiveness of each 
of the policy responses adopted by UK policymakers. 
The final section concludes. 
Great Financial Crises and Its 
Causes 
In this section, we provide a brief discussion of the 
immediate and remote causes of the worst financial 
crisis since the Great Depression. The crisis that started 
in 2007 and heightened by the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008 almost brought the global 
economy to a standstill, despite concerted effort by both 
domestic and international policymakers to restore 
stability to the global financial system. The causes of 
the crisis are multiple and there had been finger-
pointing; the financial markets, policymakers and 
                                                             
3 Gross domestic Product (GDP) in the United Kingdom in 
2008 and 2009 were -0.8% and -5.2 % respectively 
4 “Banking Crisis: dealing with the failure of the UK banks”, 
House of Commons Treasury Committee, Seventh Report of 
Session 2008-2009. April 2009. 
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/.../41
6/416.pdf 
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regulators among others have all been singled out for 
blame and eight years later, the blame game continues.  
Two major factors have been identified as the root cause 
of the Great Financial Crisis, macroeconomic policies 
adopted in the years preceding the crisis particularly in 
most of the developed economies have been identified 
as a major culprit. A considerable amount of literature 
explained that the root causes of the crisis can be traced 
to both economic policies and inadequate regulatory 
framework. Adrian Blundel-Wignal and Paul Atkinson 
(2008) submitted that global macro policies lead to the 
creation of excess liquidity in the system while the 
regulatory framework was not adequate enough to 
provide the required control of the financial system. 
Obstfeld M. and Rogoff K. (2009) on the other hand 
state that the major cause of the crisis was the economic 
policies. They explained that these policies created a 
negative platform on which other factors developed (see 
also Taylor 2008, Calomiris 2008). They argued that the 
loose monetary policies give rise to low inflation and 
low interest rates. Figure 1 below shows the United 
Kingdom Government Bond 10Y from 1985 to 2014, it 
decreased to 1.90 percent in December of 2012 from 
11.7 percent in December of 1990. Low interest-rate 
created a conducive environment for the purchase of 
residential mortgages and incentive to markets 
participants to pursue riskier assets for higher returns.   
It is impossible not to mention the contribution of global 
imbalance to the in the periods leading to the crisis ( see 
Bernanke 2009, Morris 2008), where countries such as 
the UK and the US run large current account deficit 
compare to large surpluses run by other countries 
particularly the emerging economies such as China (see 
Table 2).  
 
Data Source: Bank of England 
Figure 1: Falling Interest Rates – 10Y UK Government Bond  
Table 2: Top Ten Surplus and Deficit Economies5 (Absolute value) 
Surplus Economies Deficit Economies 
1996 2007   1996 2007   
9 1 China 1 1 United States 
102 2 Germany 26 2 Spain 
1 3 Japan 7 3 United Kingdom 
3 4 Netherlands 4 4 Australia 
5 5 Switzerland 118 5 Italy 
10 6 Sweden 15 6 Greece 
6 7 Singapore 25 7 Turkey 
8 8 Chinese Taipei 116 8 France 
12 9 Canada 23 9 Romania 
92 10 Malaysia 12 10 Portugal 
Data Source: OECD, IMF 
                                                             
5 Kowalski, P. and M. Lesher (2011) 
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According to the Office for National Statistics data, the 
United Kingdom has consistently recorded yearly 
Current Account deficit since 1984 with a steady 
increase up to 1989. Figure 2 below shows the UK 
Current account from 1993 to 2013. The current account 
deficit narrowed between 1993 and 1997. Between 1998 
and 2008 it widens to £56.4 billion in 2008 then 
narrowed to £27.0 billion in 2011. From 2012 the deficit 
account has continued to widen, it reached a record high 
of £72.4 billion in 2013.It has been argued that the 
growing imbalance has become unsustainable which 
resulted in huge financial flows and help to push down 
the interest rates in the UK and other countries with 
large current account deficit. Martin, C. and Milas, C 
(2009) find that sharp rise in liquidity between 2001 – 
2007 was as a result of large current account deficit and 
loose monetary policy.  
Impact of the Financial Crisis on 
the UK Economy  
After many years of successive Gross Domestic Growth 
(GDP) growth, the UK GDP contracted sharply during 
2008 second and third quarters and entered into a 
recession.  The contraction in the GDP lasted for six 
consecutive quarters to the third quarter of 2009 (See 
Figure 3). The GDP fell by 2.6% in the first quarter of 
2009 and the actual economy contracted by -5% at the 
end of the year making the recession the “deepest” in 
the UK since the second World War. The recession has 
a significant impact on the UK economy, with severe 
impacts on the economy, unemployment, wages, budget 
deficit, taxation, government spending and the different 
sectors of the economy.  
Unemployment & Labour Productivity: As the great 
recession lingers on, many firms continues to lay off 
their employees, while majority cut back the 
employment of new ones  in an effort to reduce costs; 
more than 2.6 million people were unemployed in the 
United Kingdom. During the recession, labour 
productivity in the United Kingdom was very weak due 
to both cyclical reasons and causes related to the effects 
of the financial crisis.  
Government Spending: The recession caused a rise in 
government spending; rising government spending on 
welfare payment in the form of benefit and income 
support for a large unemployed population and migrants 
from the European Union.   
Budget Deficit: spending during the crisis deepened the 
UK budget deficit, the stimulus programme 
implemented during the crisis, the collapse in tax 
revenues and the rise in welfare spending (automatic 
fiscal stabilisers) all contributed to the increase in the 
budget deficit.  
Policy Response  to the Financial 
Crisis in the UK  
The collapse of Northern Rock Bank6 in 2007 marked 
the beginning of the British government intervention in 
stemming the negative impacts of the crisis on both the 
economy and the financial system. Following an 
announcement by the bank of funding problems, the 
government announced it would provide an implicit 
guarantee for deposits in Northern Rock Bank. Shortly 
after the nationalisation of Northern Rock Bank, the 
government waded into rescuing other vulnerable 
financial institutions and the large economy by enacting 
a wide range of financial and economic policies. In this 
paper we would limit our discussion to the 
macroeconomic policies implemented by the UK 
government:   
Macroeconomic Measures  
This section summarises the macroeconomic policies 
adopted in the United Kingdom in response to the 
financial crisis. Interest Rates The Bank of England 
Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) cut interest rates 
from 5.0% in September 2008 to 0.5% in March 2009.  
This rate represents the lowest in more than three 
centuries. Six years after the recession, the policy rates 
remain unchanged (see Figure 4). The Bank of England 
introduced Quantitative Easing (QE)7 policy measure in 
response to the recession in March 2009. Quantitative 
Easing (Asset Purchase Facility) policy is primarily 
implemented to stimulate the level of economic activity 
or demand during the recession. Under this policy, the 
Bank of England creates new money and injects it into 
the economy by buying financial assets, like 
government bonds to stimulate spending by companies 
particularly financial institutions. With more cash at the 
disposal of these financial firms, it is hoped that banks 
will be encouraged to lend more money to their 
customers; this will make more money available to 
consumers to spend.  
                                                             
6 Northern Rock Bank was the fifth-largest mortgage lender in 
the United Kingdom. The bank was nationalised by the UK 
government in February 2008 and injected £3bn to help the 
bank’s funding problems. 
7 Bank of England News Release, Bank of England Reduces 
Bank Rates by 0.5 Percentage Points to 0.5% and to 
Undertake a Programme of Asset Purchases of £75 Billion, 5 
March 2009. 
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Data Source: Office for National Statistics  
Figure 2: United Kingdom Current Account (GBP billion) 
 
 
Data Source: Office for National Statistics (ONS) 
Figure 3: Gross Domestic Product - United Kingdom, (quarterly growth): Percentage change 
 
Data Source: Bank of England 
Figure 4: U.K Monetary Policy Rates, Monthly, 2007 – 2011 (per cent) 
Quantitative Easing (QE) 
The BOE sets the initial level of QE at £75 billion; this 
amount has been reviewed upward at various MPC 
meeting. From March 2009 to January 2010, a total of 
£200 billion worth of assets were purchased by the 
Bank of England representing about 14% of annual 
GDP. Further asset purchases between 2011 and 2012 
pushed the total commitment to QE to £375 billion. 
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This policy involves the government varying the level 
of tax and public spending to meet economic policy 
objectives and influence the Aggregate Demand (AD)8 
in the economy. During the recession, the main 
objectives of the government fiscal policy include 
stimulating economic growth and keeping inflation 
within the target of 2%. The government made use of 
both automatic stabilisers and discretionary measures to 
prevent the recession from deepening. In the 2008 pre-
Budget Report (PBR) the Labour government embarked 
on discretionary fiscal measures to prop the economy as 
monetary policy – interest rates are not enough to 
stimulate the economy. This involves mainly the 
temporary cut in the standard rate of Value Added Tax 
(VAT) from 17.5% to 15% from 1 December 2008 to 
31 December 2009, at a cost of £12.4 billion.9 The 
government also announced a number of other measures 
to raise revenue, including an increase in the rates of 
National Insurance Contributions for employees, 
employer and the self-employed by a 0.5% point from 
April 2011. In Budget 201010, the labour government 
announced further fiscal measures including: a top rate 
of income tax of 50% on incomes over £150,000 from 
April 2010, an increase in national insurance by 1% 
point from April 2011 and reduction in public spending 
growing by 0.8% per year between 2011/12 and 
2014/15 and public sector net investment will fall to 
1.25% of GDP by 2013-14. 
Change in government saw a reverse of the some of the 
above fiscal policies, as the Coalition government put 
more emphasis on deficit reduction. In the 2011 budget, 
the government announced a package of fiscal 
tightening of about £40billion by 2014 and 2015. VAT 
rates increase from 17.5% to 20% from January 2011.11 
Effectiveness of Policy Responses 
to the Financial Crisis in the  
United Kingdom 
Monetary Policy  
Conventional monetary policy does not proof to be a 
very effective instrument for managing the crisis. The 
Bank of England dropped the policy rates from 5% to its 
effective lower bound of 0.5%. Once the effective lower 
bound is reached, monetary policy becomes 
significantly limited in scope to incentivise a depressed 
                                                             
8  AD is the total level of planned expenditure in an economy (AD = C+I+G+X-M) 
9 HC Deb 24 November 2008 c492, c 495 
10 Economic and Fiscal Strategy Report and Financial 
Statement and Budget Report, March 2010 
11 HM Treasury: Budget 2011, HC 836. March 2011 
economy. With this limitation in mind, the BOE 
embarked on an unconventional monetary policy of 
asset purchases or quantitative easing (QE) to stem the 
economy rot. Evidences from literatures and other 
sources indicate that the implementation of quantitative 
easing by the Bank of England had a substantial impact 
on both gilt yield and corporate bonds, and also help to 
stimulate the economy during the recession (See, Meier 
(2009), Baumeister and Benati 2010, Joyce et al. 2011, 
Agarwal et al. 2010, D’Amico and King 2010). 
Hamilton (2010) does not find the effect of QE to be 
significant.  
Baumeister and Benati 2010, find that without QE, real 
growth in the UK would have been 4 percentage point 
lower in 2009Q1. Weale and Wieladek (2014) in a 
recent study concluded that quantitative easing 
equivalent to one-percent of GDP, is proportional to 
0.18 and 0.3 percentage-point increase in UK real GDP 
and CPI respectively after five to eight quarters of 
quantitative easing. 
                                                                                                                             
Fiscal Policy Contrasting to the monetary economics, 
the British government follow the Keynesian economic 
blueprint of expansionary fiscal policies via an increase 
in public spending and cuts in tax rates to stimulate the 
depressed economy. There are evidences that the fiscal 
policies adopted by the government produced the 
desired result of stabilising the economy, curtailing the 
severity and shortening the duration of the crisis (See 
Alesina, 2012 and Shoag, 2012). Dolls et al (2010) 
analyzed the effectiveness of the transfer systems in the 
European Union and the US to act as an automatic 
stabilizer during the financial crisis. They find that 
automatic stabilizers absorb 38 per cent of a 
proportional income shock in the EU, against 32 percent 
in the US. For unemployment shock 48 percent of the 
shock are absorbed in the EU, compared to 34 per cent 
in the US, and concluded that the cushioning of 
disposable income leads to a demand stabilization of 23 
to 32 percent in the EU and 19 per cent in the US.  With 
respect to theduration of the crisis, Baldacci et al (2009) 
concluded that timely implementation of countercyclical 
fiscal measures contributes to shortening the length of 
crisis by stimulating aggregate demand in the economy.  
In a study conducted by the International Monetary 
Fund, the Fund concludes that fiscal policy is an 
appropriate countercyclical policy tool, particularly 
when monetary policy has reached the zero lower bound 
(See IMF, 2013).  
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UK Financial  Crisis 
Macroeconomic Policy 
Scorecard  
Steady Economy Growth - (GDP)  
The fact that the economic policies adopted by the 
British government to manage the Great Recession are 
effective can be inferred from the pattern of the UK 
economic performance since the outbreak of the crisis. 
According to the Office for National Statistics, The 
Quarterly National Accounts confirmed that the UK 
economy grew at an unrevised rate of 0.7% in Q3 2014, 
contributing to an annual growth of 2.6%. This 
represents the seventh consecutive quarter of GDP 
growth since the beginning of the economic crisis in 
2008. Figure 5 shows the pattern of economic growth 
right after the end of the crisis, presenting GDP and 
GDP per capita. The level of GDP growth was about 
2.2% higher in Q3 2014 than in Q4 2013. 
 Fall in Unemployment Rate  
Data from the Office for National Statistic (ONS) 
confirmed that the unemployment rate12 in the UK 
decreased to 5.7 percent in December 2014 compared to 
5.8 percent in the previous period, the fall is the lowest 
levels since the height of the financial crisis (See Figure 
6).  The unemployment rate was as high as 8.0 percent 
during 2008 – 2009 during the financial crisis rising to 
about 8.5 percent in 2012. Figure 6 shows a steady 
decrease in unemployment from this level to December 
2014.  
Increase in Public Debt 
The Great Financial Crisis have provoked a massive 
increase in UK’s public debt, Since the inception of the 
financial crisis in 2008,  net public debtor rose 
significantly from 45% to 74% of GDP at the end of the 
first quarter in 2009 and 2013 respectively13. Figure 7 
shows the sharp increase in Public Debt from 2000/2001 
to 2012/2013, the rise was very pronounced from 
2007//2008. It is important, however to note that not all 
the total public debt in the UK is due to the effect of the 
                                                             
12 The unemployment rate is the proportion of the 
economically active population (those in work plus those 
seeking and available to work) who were unemployed.(ONS) - 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_378901.pdf 
 
13 For more detail, see UK Public Sector debt and borrowing 
1975 to 2013 (Office for National Statistics)       
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/psa/public-sector-finances/july-
2013/sty-public-sector-debt.html 
 
financial crisis and recession, according to an OECD 
measure, the United Kingdom structural budget deficit 
stood at 3.1% of the national income in 2007. However, 
from 2008 to 2009, government borrowing has jumped 
to a total of 6.7% of national income, this amount 
includes 5.2% of national income to fund a structural 
gap between government receipt and spending, 0.6% of 
national income was attributable to meeting the 
temporary fiscal stimulus implemented during the 
recession. Further borrowing from 2009 to 2010, shoot 
up government borrowing to about £165.5billion, that 
is, 11.8% of national income with the Treasure 
forecasting a further rise in structural borrowing post-
2010. The amount of government debt post-2007 is a 
direct reflection of expansionary fiscal policy measures 
implemented to manage the crisis. The Bank of England 
commenced the policy of Quantitative Easing (QE)14 in 
2009, a policy will which the government borrowed 
money to fund the coupon payments to the Bank of 
England.  
The Monetarist would argue that Quantitative Easing, 
fiscal stimulus and other policy measures such as bank 
bail-outs implemented to curtail the crisis have 
contributed to the massive public net debt which rose 
from £337 billion in 2000 to £1 trillion in March 2011. 
As at the last quarter of 2014, the total public net debt in 
the UK stood at £1.26 trillion.15 
                                                             
14 Quantitative Easing (QE) reached £375billion as at 
November 2012over the original limit of £150billion. 
15 This amount does not include the cost of Bank bail-outs 
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Data Source: Office for National Statistics (ONS) 
Figure 5: GDP, GDP per capita, and Net National Disposable Income per capita, seasonally adjusted 
 
 
Data Source: Office for National Statistics (ONS) 
Figure 6: United Kingdom Unemployment Rate (% Economically Active) 
 
Data Source: Office for National Statistics  (All data excluding the temporary effects of financial interventions) 
Figure 7: Public sector net debt as a percentage of GDP, 2000/01 to 2012/13 
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Conclusion 
The impact of the recent financial crisis on the real 
economy, the financial system and on ordinary people is 
still being felt in different part of the globe. The nature 
and the severity of the effect on the economy prompted 
policy makers and Central Banks around the world to 
navigate an uncharted territory of policy measures to 
curb the rampaging global crisis. In addition to other 
policy measures implemented by the British 
government, the Bank of England adopted a plurality of 
macroeconomic policies including expansionary fiscal 
policy, and traditional monetary policy of cutting the 
policy rates. Lowering the BOE policy rates help to 
stimulate demand which would provide a basis for 
economic recovery. The nature and duration and 
complexity of the crisis made it difficult for BoE to 
continue to rely on this tool as the policy rates soon hit 
the zero lower bound. The premier bank was forced to 
rethink their monetary policy strategy for combating the 
crisis, the bank adopted a more aggressive and 
unconventional monetary policy of large-scale asset 
purchases or Quantitative Easing (QE). There is a broad 
agreement between our review and the empirical 
evidences found in this paper that both the expansionary 
fiscal and the unconventional monetary policies adopted 
by the Bank of England were effective and played a 
significant role in re-directing and stimulating the 
economy during the crisis. These policy tools and other 
measures have helped the UK to shorten the duration of 
the crisis, stimulate economic growth and promote 
financial stability.  
However, the evaluation of the expansionary fiscal 
policy and unconventional monetary policy 
implemented by the Bank of England has shown that 
these policies do have their limitations. Just as the 
traditional monetary policy of lowering interest rates 
could not be relied on to add more value to the economy 
when it reaches its effective lower zero lower bound, so 
also is the unconventional quantitative easing policy. 
Policy makers should not regard these unconventional 
policies as the new norm, as their prolonged use could 
cause other problems in the economy. For example, 
continued use of quantitative easing in a low interest-
rate regime could promote excessive risk-taking and 
increase moral hazards. As noted in this paper, 
expansionary fiscal policy cum aggressive asset 
purchase could add to the public debt woe.  
It is important that further studies continue to research 
into the framework of implementing unconventional 
policies with a view to balancing their usefulness and 
the inherent risks associated with them. In particular, 
future studies should attempt to answer the following 
questions: 
What are the impact of implementation  lags on 
efficiency of monetary policy 
What is the full impact of implementing quantitative 
easing in an environment of low interest-rates? 
What are the real cost of “Crowding effect”, of increase 
in government spending, on long- term growth of an 
economy.  
What is the impact of excessive government spending in 
an aging population? 
What are the ramifications of implementing asset 
purchases and how its benefits are distributed in the 
economy?  
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